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I.

INTRODUCTION

In early 2010, this author was fortunate to be presented with a
special opportunity: the chance to join the state’s premier
prosecution office on a special assignment to prosecute mortgage
loan and real estate fraud. It was both a personally gratifying and

† University of Minnesota Law School, J.D., magna cum laude (2006). The
author is presently a prosecutor in the Complex Crime Unit of the Hennepin
County Attorney’s Office. The views expressed by this author do not necessarily
reflect those of the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office. The author would,
however, like to thank Hennepin County Attorney Mike Freeman for his
continued commitment to prosecutions of financial fraud in Minnesota’s largest
county as well as Senior Assistant Hennepin County Attorney Emery Adoradio and
colleague Amber Brennan for their important contributions to this case. The
author also thanks the Minnesota Department of Commerce for their excellent
work putting together such a complex set of facts and Detective Brandon Johnson
for his many hours of testimony and many more hours of investigative efforts.
Finally, no list of appreciation is complete without this author thanking his
mentors in the art of trial lawyering, namely his father, George T. Sinas, and
attorney Kathleen Flynn Peterson, as well as his wife, best friend, and muse, Shelly.

1643

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

1

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 5 [2013], Art. 9

1644

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:5

timely assignment. The United States was in the throes of the
Great Recession—a financial crisis that, in the words of former
Harvard Law School Professor Elizabeth Warren, “began one lousy
1
mortgage at a time.” Criminal prosecutors around the country
were pursuing cases against individuals in the mortgage lending
business whose actions helped bring about the economic
implosion. And locally, the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office
was in the midst of a series of successful criminal prosecutions of
2
Twin Cities mortgage brokers, realtors, and closing agents.
Much of the activity in mortgage fraud prosecutions, both
nationally and locally, centered on loans from the subprime
lending boom. Loan products that have now become infamous—
“stated income,” “low doc,” and “no doc” loans—made credit too
easy and attracted swarms of criminal activity. But as the Great
Recession took hold, the subprime lending market evaporated,
property values plummeted, and communities became awash in
foreclosed homes. Criminal prosecutors working in 2010 still had a
large backlog of cases from the real estate boom years. But many,
including this author, wondered, would criminals adapt to the new
market environment, or would mortgage fraud disappear like
subprime loans? At the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office, that
question was answered when prosecutors were presented with a
case known as “Mortgage Planners.”
II. OVERVIEW OF THE MORTGAGE PLANNERS CASE
The Mortgage Planners case was a criminal prosecution
involving two primary defendants, a husband and wife from
Hudson, Wisconsin, named James Ober and Wendy Ober (a.k.a
3
Wendy Spinks). The case was named after the St. Paul-based
mortgage brokerage firm that the Obers owned and operated,
Mortgage Planners, Inc.
The evidence presented demonstrated that the Obers had
1. Elizabeth Warren, Fine Print, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-srv/special/opinions/outlook/spring-cleaning/fine-print.html
(last
visited Apr. 18, 2013).
2. See, e.g., State v. Pratt, No. A09-2323, 2011 WL 2175760 (Minn. Ct. App.
June 6, 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 813 N.W.2d 868 (Minn. 2012); State v.
Maxwell, No. A09-2018, 2011 WL 1544505 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2011); State v.
Skaar, No. A09-1843, 2010 WL 3958431 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2010); State v.
Rosenlund, No. A09-358, 2010 WL 771773 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2010).
3. The defendants’ case numbers are Hennepin County District Court File
Nos. 27-CR-11-18122 and 27-CR-11-18119.
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devised a mortgage fraud scheme unlike any seen in Minnesota.
The criminal complaint summarized the scheme as follows:
Complainant’s
investigation
reveals
that
from
approximately June 2009 through August 2010,
Defendants and their co-conspirators participated in a
complex scheme to fraudulently obtain millions of dollars
of mortgage loan proceeds for the purchase of distressed
residential properties throughout the Twin Cities
metropolitan area. Defendants’ scheme used “straw
buyers” to purchase the distressed properties using
mortgage loans guaranteed by the Federal Housing
Administration (“FHA”) that Defendants originated
through their mortgage brokerage, Mortgage Planners,
Inc. In order to qualify the straw buyers for the federallyinsured loans, Defendants devised a sophisticated scheme
involving phony employers, bogus bank statements and
paystubs, forged college transcripts, counterfeit court
documents, and staged down payment gift funds.
Defendants then illicitly profited from the scheme by
recording against the properties sham junior mortgages
that were payable to their business entities or associates.
Defendants used the sham mortgages so that, upon the
sale of the property, they could collect substantial
kickbacks of loan proceeds through supposed “payoffs” of
4
their sham mortgages.
The complaint then went on to explain the intricate details of
the defendants’ alleged crime. First, the complaint explained how
the distressed real estate market created a crime of opportunity:
Defendants’ fraud scheme exploited a number of factors
unique to the current depressed real estate market. First,
Defendants targeted distressed homes that were in
foreclosure. Second, Defendants’ scheme focused on a
certain subset of distressed homes—foreclosed properties
that had been sold at sheriff’s foreclosure sales for a
fraction of the total debt owed by the homeowner. This
allowed Defendants to take advantage of a technical
provision of Minnesota real estate law. In Minnesota, a
home is sold at a sheriff’s foreclosure sale to the highest
bidder, which is typically the foreclosing lender (also
known as the mortgagee). The sheriff’s sale price
effectively replaces the existing mortgage on the home.
4. Amended Complaint at 2, State v. Ober, Nos. 27-CR-11-18122, 27-CR-1118119 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 8, 2011).
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Then, through a process known as redemption, a
homeowner can reclaim the property by paying the
sheriff’s sale price within approximately six months of the
sheriff’s sale.
Traditionally, lenders’ bids at sheriffs’ sales were
equal or close to the total debt owed by the homeowner.
Following the recent real estate market crash, however,
many lenders have bid only a fraction of the total debt
owed. In many cases, low bids by lenders have the effect
of creating equity in the home—equity that equals the
difference between the home’s market value and the
sheriff’s sale price.
For example, suppose (1) a
homeowner has a $200,000 mortgage on his home that
goes into foreclosure; (2) the market value of the home at
the time of the foreclosure is $150,000; and (3) the lender
bids only $50,000 at the sheriff’s sale. If the homeowner
pays the $50,000 sheriff’s sale price (plus interest and
fees) within the redemption period, the homeowner will
own the home (worth $150,000) free of the previous
mortgage. Thus, the lender’s low bid would have the
effect of creating $100,000 worth of equity. As discussed
below, Defendants not only targeted foreclosed properties
with low sheriff’s sale prices but also devised a scheme to
direct as personal payments to themselves nearly all of the
equity created by those low sheriff’s sale prices.
The third factor of the depressed real estate market
that Defendants exploited was homeowners’ ignorance of
the foreclosure process. That is, many homeowners were
(and still are) unaware that they could redeem their
homes by paying the sheriff’s sale price.
Rather,
homeowners reasonably believed that they were required
to pay off the entire debt owed in order to keep their
homes. In fact, until recently, Minnesota law perpetuated
this misunderstanding by mandating disclosures to
homeowners in foreclosure that erroneously stated that
homeowners could redeem by paying off the total debt
owed (as opposed to the sheriff’s sale price).
The final aspect of the real estate market that
Defendants used to further their fraud scheme was the
widespread availability of FHA-insured mortgage loans.
Following the recent collapse of subprime lending, [the
United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development] increased the availability of FHA-insured
mortgage loans in an effort to help stabilize the mortgage
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market. An FHA-insured mortgage loan is funded by a
bank or mortgage company but the risk of default is
insured by the federal government. FHA-insured loans
are also unique in that they permit eligible borrowers to
purchase a home with as little as a 3.5% down payment
that can be in the form of a gift from the borrower’s
family. Unlike subprime loans, many of which required
little or no documentation of a borrower’s
creditworthiness, FHA-insured loans are subject to strict
underwriting requirements and require a substantial
amount of documentation in order to satisfy those
5
requirements.
Second, the complaint explained how the defendants used
loan origination fraud (i.e., fraud in obtaining mortgage loans) as
6
the engine to power their scheme. That is, the money that the
Obers stole came from loan proceeds that were used to purchase
homes. “In order to facilitate the sales, [the d]efendants used a
7
group of ‘straw buyers.’” As the complaint described, “The straw
buyers were individuals in whose names the homes were purchased
but who could not, in reality, qualify for the loans for which they
applied and largely did not intend to occupy or otherwise be
8
responsible for the homes.” The complaint also explained how
the defendants recruited and often paid individuals to act as the
9
buyers. In many instances, after a home was purchased in a straw
10
buyer’s name, the defendants then operated the home as a rental.
The complaint then described the defendants’ “vast facade of
lies” that was used to trick lenders into believing that the
11
individuals applying for loans were qualified borrowers.
That
facade included the creation of fictional employers and the
submission to lenders of loan applications and other documents
12
falsely stating that the borrowers worked for these employers. The
names of the fictional employers included supposed health care
companies like “Bio Medical Solutions,” restaurants such as
“Franconello Italian Restaurant,” and construction firms like

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 4–6.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
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13

“Heartland Paving.”
The complaint described how the
defendants listed bogus physical addresses for these employers and
14
maintained separate telephone numbers for each employer.
Those phone numbers were then all routed to one “phone tree”
that the defendants answered to falsely verify the borrowers’
15
employment.
In addition, the complaint described how the defendants
created a host of forged documents in order to bolster the lies in
16
the borrowers’ loan applications. The defendants submitted to
lenders bogus paystubs and bank account statements that
purported to show that the borrowers earned the income stated on
17
their loan applications.
In addition, the defendants’ scheme
involved the use of forged college transcripts, including transcripts
18
The
from local institutions like the University of Minnesota.
transcripts were used “to falsely explain the difference between the
borrowers’ previous income and their new false income from their
19
fictitious employment.”
Furthermore, and perhaps most shockingly, the defendants’
scheme used counterfeit divorce decrees that purported to be
20
issued by Minnesota district courts. As the complaint described,
“The counterfeit decrees were used to ‘divorce’ borrowers from
their existing mortgage debt. That is, the decrees included
provisions that purportedly transferred the borrowers’ homes and
all associated mortgage debt from the borrower to the borrower’s
21
ex-spouse.”
Some of the counterfeit divorce decrees used the
names and signatures of actual Minnesota district court judges,
22
whereas others used fictitious judges. Additionally, the complaint
described the down-payment fraud component, noting first that
“federal law permits borrowers obtaining FHA-insured loans to put
as little as a 3.5% down payment and allows borrowers to use
23
money gifted to them from family members for this purpose.”
The defendants fraudulently misrepresented the source of the
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5–6.
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down payment funds. “That is, Defendants represented to lenders
that the gifted down payment funds were from various relatives of
the borrowers . . . [who, i]n reality, . . . had no relation to the
24
borrowers.”
A review of bank records demonstrated that the
supposed gift funds actually came from accounts controlled by the
25
defendants and their co-conspirators.
Third, the complaint described how the defendants used
junior mortgages as vehicles for collecting illicit profits:
Defendants used a sophisticated scheme of junior
mortgages to direct kickbacks of loan proceeds to
themselves. This aspect of the fraud scheme involved the
creation of second (and sometimes third) mortgages that
were purportedly entered into between the sellers of the
properties and various entities or associates of the
Defendants.
These junior mortgages shared similar
characteristics.
First, the junior mortgages were
supposedly dated before the properties went into
foreclosure but were not recorded against the properties
until after the sheriff’s foreclosure sale. Second, the
mortgage amounts were very large and roughly
represented the total amount of equity in the home that
had been created by the low sheriff’s sale price. Third,
the mortgages were shams. That is, a review of the
mortgagee’s bank records reveals that the mortgagees
(i.e., the entities or associates of the Defendants) never
lent money to the homeowners.
Defendants used the junior mortgages to disguise
payments to themselves. As is customary at a real estate
closing, the seller’s proceeds (which come from the
buyer’s financing) are used to pay off the seller’s existing
mortgage debt. Thus, Defendants would time the closings
to occur after their sham mortgages were recorded but
before the end of the redemption period. That way, the
seller’s proceeds (which came from loans that Defendants
fraudulently obtained in straw buyers’ names) paid off the
existing sheriff’s sale price as well as the sham junior
mortgages. When the sellers’ proceeds were not enough
to pay the amounts supposedly owed on the sham junior
mortgages, the mortgagees controlled by Defendants
would send letters to the closing agent agreeing to “short”
payoffs.
Thus, Defendants used the sham junior
24.
25.

Id. at 6.
Id.
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mortgages to cash out for themselves at the time of
closing nearly all of the equity in the home.
The sham junior mortgages also acted as a failsafe way
for the Defendants to acquire the properties for
themselves if the transaction did not close. Under
Minnesota law, if the homeowner does not redeem, a
junior creditor can redeem a foreclosed property by
paying off the senior mortgages. Thus, if Defendants were
not able to structure a purchase using a straw buyer and
fraudulently-obtained loan proceeds, Defendants’ sham
junior mortgages gave them the ability to acquire
properties with existing equity by simply paying off the
sheriff’s sale price.
For the nine transactions described in this Complaint,
the total amount of kickbacks paid to Defendants by way
of the sham junior mortgages was over $840,000. In all
but one case, the kickback for each transaction was
26
between $63,000 and $157,000.
Finally, although the complaint focused on the details of nine
different transactions, it explained that the defendants’ scheme was
much larger. Specifically, “an internal review by [a lender-victim]
indicated that it issued a total of nearly $10 million in FHA-insured
mortgage loans in transactions brokered by Defendants for the
purchase of approximately 65 properties in Minnesota. A vast
majority of those transactions have indicia of loan origination
27
fraud . . . .”
As the above details describe, the majority of the transactions
in the defendants’ fraud scheme involved the use of straw buyers.
Yet after the initial complaint was filed, evidence developed
showing that the defendants’ crime involved more than witting
buyers, but also the use of stolen identities. Specifically, in the
months after the initial filing, law enforcement received
information regarding a transaction concerning the stolen identity
of a woman named “R.V.” and the purchase of a North Minneapolis
home in her name. That information led to an additional
amendment of the complaint that described the theft of R.V.’s
identity and over $125,000 in mortgage loan financing that was
used to purchase, in her name, a property located on Morgan
28
Avenue North in Minneapolis.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id. at 2.
Second Amended Complaint at 21–23, State v. Ober, Nos. 27-CR-11-
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As the amendment described, R.V. “previously resided in New
Hope, Minnesota, with her husband and child before returning to
29
[her native] El Salvador in March 2010.” R.V.’s husband told law
enforcement that he learned of his wife’s stolen identity in the
spring of 2011 after receiving in the mail a disconnection notice
30
regarding utilities for the Morgan Avenue North property. R.V.
never lived on Morgan Avenue North, and she never purchased
nor authorized anyone to purchase that home or any home in her
31
name. Nevertheless, according to county property records and
mortgage loan documents, the property was sold to R.V. in June
32
2010, three months after she had left the United States.
The sellers of the property “stated that they had no knowledge
33
of any sale to R.V.”
Rather the sellers believed that they had
deeded the property in March or April of 2010, while the property
was in foreclosure, to an employee of Mortgage Planners in
34
exchange for approximately $1000. The property had been sold
at a sheriff’s foreclosure sale, and the amount necessary to recover
35
it from the bank was a fraction of the property’s value.
The sale of the property to R.V. was financed using an FHA36
insured loan. A review of the loan documents showed that the
37
information provided to the lender came from the defendants.
The documents provided to the lender included fraudulent
documents similar to those used in other transactions. They
included phony paystubs from a fake employer for whom R.V.
never worked, a letter from a supposed gift donor who had no
relationship with R.V., and a counterfeit divorce decree from
Hennepin County District Court that purported to terminate the
38
marriage of R.V. and her husband. In addition, evidence seized
from a search of the Obers’ Wisconsin home showed their direct
involvement in the theft of R.V.’s identity. Specifically, on June 4,
2010, just before the loan was funded, but months after R.V. left
the country, Wendy Ober sent James Ober the following text
18122, 27-CR-11-18119 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 21, 2011).
29. Id. at 21.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 22.
38. Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

9

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 5 [2013], Art. 9

1652

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:5

message: “Set up that other phone for [R.V.] and i will use that to
talk to the lender back and forth, have peter set it up for me under
39
her address in new hope.” In addition, documents seized at the
Obers’ home included a U.S. Postal Service form that changed
R.V.’s address to the Obers’ home as well as statements for credit
cards in R.V.’s name listing the Obers’ home as the billing
40
address.
At closing, approximately $31,500 of the sellers’ proceeds were
disbursed to the Hennepin County Sheriff to redeem the property
41
from foreclosure. Yet an additional almost $91,000 was paid to
one of the Obers’ entities, “Eagle River Financial,” to pay off a
42
second mortgage. The second mortgage in favor of Eagle River
was purportedly signed by the sellers in October 2009 but not
recorded until March of 2010—approximately three months after
43
the property had been sold at a sheriff’s foreclosure sale. The
sellers, however, stated that they never gave Eagle River Financial a
second mortgage on the property and that they were unaware that
44
money had been disbursed to that entity. In short, the defendants
made approximately $91,000 by structuring the sale of a home
from sellers who had no knowledge of what was actually occurring
to a woman who did not live in the country.
III. THE OFFENSE OF RACKETEERING AND ITS APPLICATION TO
THE MORTGAGE PLANNERS CASE
In 1989, the Minnesota legislature enacted the Racketeering
45
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.
The statute, often
referred to as “RICO” or simply “racketeering,” was modeled after
46
To laypersons and many practitioners,
its federal counterpart.
racketeering conjures images of Mafia-style organized crime. And
in its first decades, Minnesota’s racketeering statute was successfully
used in prosecutions involving “traditional” organized crime such

39. Id. (errors in original).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 22–23.
44. Id. at 23.
45. See generally MINN. STAT. §§ 609.901–.912 (2012).
46. Gail A. Feichtinger, Note, RICO’s Enterprise Element: Redefining or
Paraphrasing to Death?, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1027, 1041 n.87 (1996) (discussing
RICO’s legislative history).
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48

as narcotics trafficking and extortion.
Yet despite these
associations, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that “our
statute is not limited to drug ‘kingpins’ or major crime
49
syndicates.” This, of course, makes sense because the statute does
not limit application to a certain persona of defendant.
Rather, the essence of the offense of racketeering lies within its
two key elements: an “enterprise” and a “pattern of criminal
50
activity.” Although the statute sets forth three different modes of
51
racketeering, all three reference the statute’s definitions of an
enterprise and a pattern of criminal activity.
An enterprise is a “sole proprietorship, partnership,
corporation, trust, or other legal entity, or a union, governmental
entity, association, or group of persons, associated in fact although
not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as legitimate
52
enterprises.” Simply put, an enterprise under the racketeering
statute is either a formal organization or an informal group of
associated persons. Furthermore, a pattern of criminal activity
includes three or more “criminal acts” that share the following
characteristics:
(1) were committed within ten years of the
commencement of the criminal proceeding;
(2) are neither isolated incidents, nor so closely related
and connected in point of time or circumstance of
commission as to constitute a single criminal offense; and
(3) were either: (i) related to one another through a
common scheme or plan or a shared criminal purpose or
(ii) committed, solicited, requested, importuned, or
intentionally aided by persons acting with the mental

47. See, e.g., State v. Kujak, 639 N.W.2d 878 (Minn. 2002).
48. See, e.g., State v. Huynh, 519 N.W.2d 191 (Minn. 1994).
49. Id. at 195.
50. § 609.903, subdiv. 1.
51. See id.
52. Id. § 609.902, subdiv. 3. In Huynh, 519 N.W.2d at 196, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the following three characteristics should be added to
the definition of an enterprise:
(1) a common purpose among the individuals associated with the
enterprise; where (2) the organization is ongoing and continuing, with
its members functioning under some sort of decision making
arrangement or structure; and where (3) the activities of the
organization extend beyond the commission of the underlying
criminal acts either to coordinate the underlying criminal acts into a
pattern of criminal activity or to engage in other activities.
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culpability required for the commission of the criminal
acts and associated with or in an enterprise involved in
53
those activities.
The criminal acts (sometimes referred to as “predicate
offenses”) that can comprise a pattern of criminal activity are
extensive and varied. They include violent crimes such as murder,
54
They also
manslaughter, assault, robbery, and kidnapping.
include crimes against justice like coercion, bribery, perjury, and
55
And finally, criminal acts under the
witness tampering.
racketeering statute include economic crimes like concealing
56
criminal proceeds, theft by swindle, and identity theft.
In this
respect, racketeering is the zenith of Minnesota’s Criminal Code.
Because of the wide range of crimes within the statutory definition
of criminal acts comprising a pattern criminal activity, racketeering
brings under one offense crimes that are otherwise unrelated.
That is, so long as the criminal acts were committed by the
defendant through his relationship with an enterprise, evidence of
all such criminal acts falls within the ambit of racketeering.
Practitioners and judges thus sometimes describe racketeering as
57
an offense with its own joinder provision.
In addition to encompassing a wide variety of criminal
conduct, the racketeering statute is a flexible tool because of the
volume of criminal conduct it can include. Although the definition
of a pattern of criminal activity requires a minimum of three
criminal acts, the statute does not cap the number of crimes that
can be considered within one offense. This makes racketeering an
especially useful tool for prosecuting defendants who engage in
prolific criminal behavior. For example, absent the racketeering
statute, a defendant who commits fifty acts of coercion might be
charged in fifty separate cases or with fifty separate counts. The
racketeering statute gives the prosecutor the option of charging all
of the conduct under one overarching charge of racketeering.
The evidence presented regarding defendants James and
Wendy Ober showed that their alleged crime was well suited for
racketeering. First, the evidence demonstrated that all of their

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
17.03.

§ 609.902, subdiv. 6.
Id. § 609.902, subdiv. 4.
Id.
Id.
For more on joinder of offenses in Minnesota, see MINN. R. CRIM. P.
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criminal acts were committed through their business, Mortgage
Planners, Inc. That business was a Minnesota corporation and
58
therefore an “enterprise” under the racketeering statute. Second,
the quantity and variety of the Obers’ crimes were a match for the
statute’s definition of a pattern of criminal activity. The evidence
presented showed not only that the Obers carried out scores of
fraudulent transactions, but also that the underlying criminal acts
included concealing criminal proceeds, theft by swindle, and
identity theft. As such, the Obers were charged with one count of
racketeering in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.903,
subdivision 1(1). That is, they were charged to have been
“employed by or associated with an enterprise, to wit, Mortgage
Planners, Inc., and intentionally conducted or participated in the
affairs of the enterprise by participating in a pattern of criminal
activity, namely, theft by swindle, identity theft, and concealing
59
criminal proceeds.” Simply stated, this offense required proof of
three basic elements: (1) the existence of an enterprise, (2) the
defendants’ association with that enterprise, and (3) a pattern of
criminal activity.
IV. STRAIGHT—BUT NOT NECESSARILY STRAIGHTFORWARD—
GUILTY PLEAS
As any practitioner or judge will attest, nearly all cases settle.
In the few that do not, settlement is usually forced out of reach
because of the parties’ divergent views on the defendant’s
culpability. It is the rarer case, however, where settlement fails even
though the parties agree that the defendant is guilty. But this was
one such case.
As the complaint demonstrated, the evidence in support of the
State’s case was substantial and detailed. It should come as no
surprise then that the defendants never asserted a claim of
innocence. Nevertheless, the parties were unable to reach a
settlement. Efforts at plea bargains were unsuccessful because the
parties had vastly different views of the appropriate sanction for the
defendants’ crime. As the State declared in various filings, it
believed this to be the most egregious mortgage fraud case ever
60
prosecuted by the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office and thus
58.
59.
60.

MINN. STAT. § 609.902, subdiv. 3 (2010).
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 28, at 24.
See, e.g., State’s Notice of Intent to Seek an Upward Sentencing

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 5 [2013], Art. 9

1656

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:5

demanded a commensurate sentence. Suffice to say that James and
Wendy Ober did not agree with the State’s assessment of their
conduct.
Because the parties could not reach a plea bargain, the
defendants elected to enter what is known as a “straight plea.”
Simply put, a straight plea means that a criminal defendant enters a
guilty plea to all counts with which he is charged without any
61
agreement or promises from the court or the State.
In most
criminal cases, the mechanics of a straight plea are relatively
straightforward.
That is, the defendant, after waiving his
62
constitutional rights, enters a factual basis establishing that he did,
in fact, commit each element of every offense charged. The trial
court then determines an appropriate sentence under the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.
Yet as this case demonstrated, the offense of racketeering and
straight pleas are strange bedfellows. The problem lies first in the
nature of the offense of racketeering. As discussed above, one
commits racketeering when one engages in a pattern of criminal
activity that consists of at least three criminal acts that can run the
63
gambit from assault to perjury. In other words, one associated
with an enterprise can commit racketeering by inflicting one
hundred brutal beatings or telling three lies in a deposition about
those beatings. And in a pure statutory sense, a factual basis in
which a defendant admits to either the beatings or the lies would
suffice for purposes of a guilty plea to the offense of racketeering.
In this case, the alleged pattern of criminal activity did not
stretch from assaults to perjury. It did, however, include allegations
64
65
of both theft by swindle and identity theft.
In addition, the
criminal complaint alleged that James and Wendy Ober committed
dozens of fraudulent transactions. Yet in their guilty pleas, James
and Wendy Ober offered much narrower views of their crime.
Most significantly, both defendants refused to admit at their guilty

Departure at 2, State v. Ober, Nos. 27-CR-11-18122, 27-CR-11-18119 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. Nov. 14, 2011).
61. See generally State v. Suing, No. A07-412, 2008 WL 132124, at *2 (Minn.
Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2008) (describing a straight guilty plea as one with no
unequivocal promise of a particular sentence).
62. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.
63. See §§ 609.902–.903.
64. See § 609.52, subdiv. 2(4).
65. See id. § 609.527, subdiv. 2.
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plea that they committed identity theft involving R.V. Rather, the
Obers presented factual bases that acknowledged a pattern of
criminal activity consisting of only theft by swindle. In addition, the
Obers initially offered factual bases that discussed only the
67
minimum three transactions. This presented a vexing question:
In a case where the State alleges racketeering through an extensive
and varied pattern of criminal acts, could the defendants enter
guilty pleas simply by confessing to three of the least severe acts?
And, if so, how should the case proceed from that point?
The problem presented by this question was not simply
theoretical. Rather, it presented serious practical considerations
for sentencing. To fully appreciate why this is so, one needs some
basic background on the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and
how racketeering is treated under the Guidelines. At the risk of
oversimplification, and understanding that the Guidelines have
been and will be subject of much authorship, the heart of the
68
Guidelines is the Sentencing Grid. That Grid has two axes, one
for the severity level of the defendant’s crime, and the other for the
69
defendant’s criminal history score. The intersection of the two
axes marks the presumptive sentence for a particular offense.
The offense of racketeering, however, is what is known as an
70
“unranked” offense.
That is, the Guidelines assign no severity
level to racketeering, thus giving the crime no presumptive
sentence. This, of course, makes sense when one considers the
varied criminal acts that can comprise a pattern of criminal activity.
To use the example again, racketeering committed through a
pattern of assaults is, and should be, treated differently that
racketeering done through multiple acts of perjury.
The
Guidelines’ unranked treatment of racketeering thus recognizes
the unique and flexible nature of the offense. But in doing so, the
Guidelines offer the trial court little guidance on how to assign a
severity level to the offense. The Guidelines simply direct judges to
“exercise their discretion by assigning an appropriate severity level
for that offense and specify on the record the reasons a particular
66. See Transcript of Proceedings, State v. Ober, No. 27-CR-11-18122 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. Apr. 12, 2012); see also Order, State v. Ober, No. 27-CR-11-18119 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. Feb. 23, 2012); Letter from Thomas Sinas to Judge Joseph Klein, State v.
Ober, No. 27-CR-11-18119 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 10, 2012).
67. See Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 66.
68. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 4.A (2012).
69. See id.
70. See id. § 5.
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71

level was assigned.” Thankfully, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has set forth a framework for how a trial court should go about
exercising that discretion. In State v. Kenard, the court held that,
when assigning a severity level to an unranked offense such as
racketeering, trial courts should consider the following four factors:
(1) the gravity of the specific conduct underlying the unranked
offense, (2) the severity level assigned to any ranked offense whose
elements are similar to the unranked offense, (3) the conduct of
and severity level assigned to other offenders for the same
unranked offense, and (4) the severity level assigned to other
72
offenders who engaged in similar conduct.
Minnesota trial courts routinely make so-called Kenard findings
when sentencing unranked offenses, so the need to do so was not
unique to the case against James and Wendy Ober. What was
unique, however, was the posture of the case in light of the
defendants’ straight pleas. The Kenard factors necessarily require
the trial court to make a series of factual findings. Most notably,
the first Kenard factor requires the trial court to consider the
73
“gravity of the specific conduct underlying the unranked offense.”
In most cases, sentencing of an unranked offense occurs after a
trial during which a lengthy record is developed concerning the
defendant’s crime. Thus, the trial court has plenty to reference
when assessing the gravity of the defendant’s crime. But in this
case, James and Wendy Ober’s straight pleas stunted the record.
There had been no trial. Thus, if the defendants’ convictions were
to be based on their guilty pleas alone, the court would have little
record on which to rely for assessing the gravity of their crime. And
what little record existed consisted of only the defendants’ versions
of their conduct.
In addition, James and Wendy Ober’s refusal to admit at their
guilty pleas to identity theft involving R.V. presented another
obstacle in sentencing their crime. This is because of the
relationship between the offense of racketeering and the criminal
acts that comprise the underlying pattern of criminal activity. In
the words of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, “Ranking
racketeering at a higher level than the predicate offenses on which
74
that charge is based has been upheld by this court.” In other
71.
72.
73.
74.

See id. § 2.A.
606 N.W.2d 440, 443 (Minn. 2000).
Id.
State v. Rosenlund, No. A09-358, 2010 WL 771773, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App.
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words, the severity level of the criminal acts that comprise the
pattern of criminal activity generally sets the “floor” for the ranking
of the racketeering offense. This concept flows directly from the
second Kenard factor that requires that the court consider the
75
severity level of similar ranked offenses.
In this case, the dispute over the identity theft of R.V. had
potential consequences for the defendants’ sentence. That was
because theft by swindle over $35,000 is a level-VI offense, whereas
76
identity theft over $35,000 is a level-VIII offense.
Thus, the
ranking floor was potentially two severity levels higher or lower,
depending on whether the facts supported the State’s or the
defendants’ view of the transaction involving R.V.
As a result of these unresolved issues, it was apparent that the
case could not proceed directly to sentencing after the defendants’
guilty pleas. Rather, the trial court would have to conduct a series
of evidentiary hearings to resolve the outstanding factual issues
pertaining to the racketeering offense. As it turns out, additional
hearings were already required because of yet another unresolved
issue separate and apart from the racketeering offense: the
existence of facts supporting an upward sentencing departure.
Before the defendants’ guilty pleas, the prosecution filed its
Notice of Intent to Seek an Upward Sentencing Departure on the
following grounds: (1) that the crime charged was a major
77
economic offense, (2) that defendants used the identities of
others—including those of Minnesota district court judges—to
78
commit their crime, (3) that defendants committed their crime as
part of a group of three or more persons who actively participated
79
in the crime, and (4) that defendants preyed on vulnerable
individuals who were losing their homes and who were ignorant of
80
the foreclosure process.
In Blakely v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court held
Mar. 9, 2010) (citing State v. Huynh, 504 N.W.2d 477, 484 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)).
75. See Racketeering Sentencing Order and Memorandum at 4, State v.
Gustafson, No. 27-CR-11-18669 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 2, 2012) (“The severity level
assigned to the predicate criminal acts is a helpful benchmark for applying the
second Kenard factor in the context of a racketeering conviction.”).
76. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5.
77. See MINN. STAT. § 244.10, subdiv. 5a(a)(4) (2010).
78. See id. § 244.10, subdiv. 5a(a)(12).
79. See id. § 244.10, subdiv. 5a(a)(10).
80. See generally id. § 244.10, subdiv. 5a(a)(1) (“[T]he victim was particularly
vulnerable due to age, infirmity, or reduced physical or mental capacity, which was
known or should have been known to the offender.”).
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that a criminal defendant has a right to demand that the State
prove to a jury the existence of facts supporting an upward
81
departure beyond a reasonable doubt. James and Wendy Ober
82
both waived their jury-trial Blakely rights. They did not, however,
admit at their guilty pleas to the existence of facts supporting an
83
upward sentencing departure. As such, the defendants put the
State to its burden of proof regarding upward departure factors.
Thus began a series of evidentiary hearings, referred to in short as
“Kenard/Blakely” hearings, which resulted in the presentation of
more evidence and testimony than is typically offered in many
trials.
V. INTO THE ABYSS: MARITAL PRIVILEGE AND CONFLICT OF LAWS
The intricate details of the evidence presented at the
Kenard/Blakely hearings are beyond the scope of this article. Suffice
to say that the State presented evidence and testimony to support
the facts set forth in the complaint, with an eye toward how that
evidence applied to the issues of offense ranking and aggravating
sentencing factors. The trial court heard testimony from witnesses
across the factual spectrum of the case, including co-conspirators,
borrowers who bought homes with loans brokered through
Mortgage Planners, distressed homeowner-sellers, mortgage
lending experts, and individuals whose identities had been
unlawfully used. In addition to testimony, the trial court received
nearly one hundred exhibits that included loan files, bank records,
and evidence obtained via search warrant.
Yet of all the evidence in the case, none sparked more dispute
than a series of text messages between James and Wendy Ober.
Those text messages were obtained when law enforcement
executed a search warrant of the Obers’ Wisconsin home, which
84
resulted in the seizure of both physical and digital evidence. One
such piece of digital evidence were text messages on James Ober’s
cell phone—including text messages between him and his wife.
One of those text messages was referenced in the criminal
complaint as direct evidence in support of the State’s claim that the
Obers stole R.V.’s identity. This text, which Wendy Ober sent to

81.
82.
83.
84.

542 U.S. 296, 301–05 (2004).
Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 66, at 8.
Id.
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 28, at 4–5.
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James Ober in the weeks before the loan in R.V.’s name was
funded, read: “Set up that other phone for [R.V.] and i will use that
to talk to the lender back and forth, have peter set it up for me
85
under her address in new hope.” This text was significant because
the evidence showed that someone posing as R.V. did, in fact, talk
with the mortgage lender that provided the loan issued in her
name.
In their pretrial motions, both James and Wendy Ober sought
to exclude all text messages between them on the grounds that the
messages were privileged marital communications. They relied on
Minnesota Statutes section 595.02 that provides:
A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife
without her consent, nor a wife for or against her husband
without his consent, nor can either, during the marriage
or afterwards, without the consent of the other, be
examined as to any communication made by one to the
86
other during the marriage.
This statute affords married couples in Minnesota two kinds of
marital privilege: the testimonial privilege and the communications
privilege. The testimonial privilege “prevent[s] a spouse from
87
The
testifying against the other during the marriage.”
communications privilege “prevent[s] a spouse from testifying at
any time concerning confidential interspousal communications
88
made during the marriage.”
Minnesota courts have held that the marital privilege is
absolute and, unlike other states, have refused to recognize any
89
exceptions to the privilege.
Yet as is often true in the Upper
Midwest, things are different on the other side of the St. Croix
River. That is, Wisconsin law recognizes an exception to its
statutory marital privilege. As the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin
held, “The marital privilege statute does not apply to
communications between spouses who conspire to act as agents for
90
each other in an unlawful transaction.”
While that may be true, did it mean anything for this case?
True, James and Wendy Ober were Wisconsin residents. But this
was a Minnesota state prosecution, venued in Hennepin County,
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 22 (errors in original).
MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subdiv. 1(a) (2010).
State v. Palubicki, 700 N.W.2d 476, 483 (Minn. 2005).
Id. (citing State v. Gianakos, 644 N.W.2d 409, 415 (Minn. 2002)).
See Gianakos, 644 N.W.2d at 409.
State v. Doney, 338 N.W.2d 852, 854 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
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where all of the alleged crimes occurred in Minnesota. And wasn’t
this conflict of laws issue something that only matters to law
students and civil litigators?
Turns out, the answer was a
resounding “no.” And the reason for that answer came from the
91
Minnesota Supreme Court in the 2004 case of State v. Heaney.
Heaney was a watershed decision concerning conflicts of law in
criminal cases. The facts arose out of a fatal, alcohol-related car
92
accident in Houston County, Minnesota. Following the accident,
the driver-defendant was transported to a hospital in La Crosse,
Wisconsin, where doctors obtained a blood sample showing a
93
blood-alcohol level of 0.144. Law enforcement later sought and
obtained a subpoena from a Wisconsin court for the defendant’s
94
medical records. The defendant was then charged in Minnesota
95
with criminal vehicular operation resulting in death.
At an omnibus hearing, the defendant sought to exclude the
blood-alcohol evidence on the grounds that it was obtained in
96
violation of Minnesota’s physician-patient privilege statute. Like
the marital communications privilege, Minnesota’s physicianpatient privilege is absolute and includes blood samples taken by
97
treating physicians. Wisconsin’s physician-patient statute, on the
other hand, has exceptions for evidence in homicide trials as well
98
as circumstances surrounding alcohol intoxication. As such, there
was a direct conflict of laws between the two states’ privileges.
The Minnesota Supreme Court therefore needed to set forth a
test for resolving conflicting evidentiary privileges in criminal cases.
The court first noted that conflicts of law tests used in civil cases,
such as lex fori (i.e., the law the forum), lex loci (i.e., the law of place
of the seminal event), or its own “better rule of law” analysis were
99
ill-suited to criminal cases. So following the lead of other states,
the court adopted the test from the Restatement (Second) of the
100
Conflict of Laws. That test set forth two prongs:
(1) Evidence that is not privileged under the local law of
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

689 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. 2004).
Id. at 170.
Id. at 171.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 173.
Id.
Id. at 174–75.
Id. at 175–76.
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the state which has the most significant relationship with
the communication will be admitted, even though it
would be privileged under the local law of the forum,
unless the admission of such evidence would be contrary
to the strong public policy of the forum.
(2) Evidence that is privileged under the local law of the
state which has the most significant relationship with the
communication but which is not privileged under the
local law of the forum will be admitted unless there is
some special reason why the forum policy favoring
101
admission should not be given effect.
The question presented under either prong, of course, is what
state has “the most significant relationship with the
communication.” The court adopted the Restatement’s definition:
“The state of ‘most significant relationship with the
communication’ will be the state where the communication took
102
place, unless there is a prior relationship between the parties.”
Furthermore, “[i]f there is a prior relationship between the parties,
the state where the relationship is centered has the most significant
relationship, unless the state where the communication took place
103
has ‘substantial contacts’ with the parties and the transaction.”
Applying the Restatement test to the facts of Heaney, the court
held that Wisconsin law applied and that the evidence was thus
104
admissible. Specifically, the court found that the communication
at issue occurred in the Wisconsin hospital where the blood sample
was taken and that there was no prior relationship between the
105
defendant and the hospital. As such, the court reversed the court
106
of appeals and remanded for trial.
Heaney had direct application to the prosecution of James and
Wendy Ober. But unlike in Heaney, the conflict of laws regarding
marital privilege could not be resolved by simply looking at where
the communications (i.e., the text messages) took place. The
reason why was because James and Wendy Ober were married—
meaning that there was “a prior relationship” between them. As
such, the issue became where their marital relationship was
101.
(1971)).
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 175 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

CONFLICTS

OF

LAW § 139

Id.
Id.
Id. at 176–77.
Id.
Id.
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107

“centered.”
To that end, at the omnibus hearing that occurred
before the defendants’ guilty pleas, the State presented testimony
concerning the Obers’ marital relationship. The evidence showed
that the Obers had lived in Wisconsin as a married couple for years,
that they owned a home together in Wisconsin, and that, at one
point in time, Wendy Ober initiated a divorce proceeding in a
108
Wisconsin state court.
So the State argued that the Obers’ marital relationship—the
relationship that was the subject of the privilege that they sought to
invoke—was centered in Wisconsin and that the trial court should
109
It
apply Wisconsin marital privilege law. The trial court agreed.
noted that Heaney controlled the issue of marital privilege. And
citing the evidence presented at the omnibus hearing, it held that
110
the Obers’ marital relationship was centered in Wisconsin.
It
thus ruled that Wisconsin law applied and refused to exclude the
111
text messages between the defendants.
VI. RANKING AND UPWARD DEPARTURES: KEEPING THE APPLES
AWAY FROM THE ORANGES
At the conclusion of the hearings, the trial court had two tasks
to complete. The first was to assign a severity-level ranking to the
defendants’ racketeering offense. The second was to determine
whether the State had proven the existence of facts supporting an
upward sentencing departure. Completing these tasks—and doing
so the right way—required a careful and measured approach.
A threshold question was whether a trial court was, in fact,
permitted to impose an aggravated sentence with an unranked
offense. Or was there a constitutional problem with a court first
exercising its discretion to assign a severity-level ranking and then
again exercising its discretion to depart from the presumptive
sentence for that ranking? Like so much jurisprudential drama,
the answer to this question was in a footnote. In Kenard, the
Minnesota Supreme Court said, “Once the sentencing court has
determined the severity level by considering the conduct
underlying proof of the elements of the offense, it is not
107. Id. at 175.
108. See Order at 4–6, State v. Ober, No. 27-CR-11-18119 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan.
17, 2012).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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prohibited, in appropriate cases, from considering whether there
are also aggravating or mitigating circumstances that would justify
112
departure.”
Although the Kenard court held that unranked offenses and
upward departures can coexist, it did not give trial courts guidance
on how to manage that coexistence.
Subsequent appellate
decisions, however, did issue warnings against double-counting a
defendant’s conduct. That is, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
stated that “the same conduct or circumstance may not be used
both to assign a severity level and to support an upward departure
113
as an aggravating factor.”
So, in essence, the trial court in this case needed to separate
into two silos evidence used to determine the ranking of the Obers’
offense and evidence pertaining to aggravating factors. This
turned out to be relatively easy to do with respect to most of the
Kenard analysis. That is because at least two of the factors—the
conduct of and severity level assigned to other offenders for the
same unranked offense and the severity level assigned to other
114
offenders who engaged in similar conduct —call for comparisons
to other cases.
A more delicate dance arose between the first Kenard factor—
the gravity of the specific conduct underlying the Obers’ offense—
and the fact that the State was seeking an upward departure on the
grounds that the crime was a major economic offense. Under
Minnesota law, a crime is a major economic offense when it has at
least two of the following characteristics:
(i) the offense involved multiple victims or multiple
incidents per victim;
(ii) the offense involved an attempted or actual monetary
loss substantially greater than the usual offense or
substantially greater than the minimum loss specified in
the statutes;
(iii) the offense involved a high degree of sophistication
or planning or occurred over a lengthy period of time;
(iv) the offender used the offender’s position or status to
facilitate the commission of the offense, including
positions of trust, confidence, or fiduciary relationships;
112. State v. Kenard, 606 N.W.2d 440, 443 n.3 (Minn. 2000).
113. Cobbins v. State, No. A07-1671, 2008 WL 4470905, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.
Oct. 7, 2008).
114. Kenard, 606 N.W.2d at 443.
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or
(v) the offender had been involved in other conduct
similar to the current offense as evidenced by the findings
of civil or administrative law proceedings or the
115
imposition of professional sanctions.
Early in the case, the State indicated its intent to seek an
upward departure on major-economic-offense grounds based on
subparts (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) of section 244.10, subdivision
116
5a(a)(4).
Yet as the sentencing phase unfolded, there appeared
to be no meaningful way to separate the evidence relating to
subparts (i) and (iii) from evidence related to the first Kenard
factor. That is, as the State acknowledged in its memorandum of
law, “because of the incredible depth and breadth of Defendants’
fraud scheme . . . there is no practical way to evaluate the gravity of
Defendants’ conduct without looking at the sophistication and
planning that went into their scheme as well as the number of
117
incidents of mortgage fraud committed by each Defendant.” The
trial court agreed. So in its initial order regarding ranking of the
defendants’ offense, the court was careful to limit the scope of
evidence it evaluated. As the court stated:
[F]or purposes of evaluating the gravity of Defendants’
conduct, the Court will look at the following: the scope of
their fraud; the sophistication used to accomplish it, both
in terms of originating mortgage loans and the means of
directing kickbacks; the market environment in which
Defendants’ perpetuated their fraud; and Defendants’
roles in the corrupt enterprise that was [Mortgage
118
Planners].
This analysis, however, did not prevent the State from seeking
an aggravated sentence on major-economic-offense grounds. That
is because the State reserved its right to seek an upward departure
based on the remaining two subparts of section 244.10, subdivision
5a(a)(4) (i.e., that the offense involved a monetary loss
substantially greater than the minimum loss specified in statute and
115. MINN. STAT. § 244.10, subdiv. 5a(a)(4) (2010).
116. See State’s Notice of Intent to Seek an Upward Sentencing Departure,
supra note 60.
117. State’s Memorandum of Law Regarding Ranking of Racketeering
Offense at 26–27, State v. Ober, Nos. 27-CR-11-18122, 27-CR-11-18119 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. May 17, 2012).
118. Order and Memorandum of Law at 7, State v. Ober, Nos. 27-CR-1118122, 27-CR-11-18119 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 9, 2012).
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that the defendants used their position or status to facilitate the
119
offense).
On August 9, 2012, the trial court completed its first task by
120
issuing an order ranking the defendants’ racketeering offense.
The court first observed the seriousness of the offense:
“Racketeering is regarded as one of the most serious criminal
offenses in Minnesota. It is an economic crime placed alongside
121
The court then analyzed
some of the most violent crimes . . . .”
each of the Kenard factors as they pertained to this case.
In evaluating the gravity of the Obers’ crime (i.e., the first
122
Kenard factor), the court called it “unique and extraordinary.” It
noted that the evidence presented showed that James and Wendy
Ober each originated over thirty-five fraudulent mortgage loans,
123
totaling over five million dollars in theft.
The court also
described how the Obers “deftly” adapted to the post-subprime
124
mortgage lending environment in order to commit their crime.
And it listed the tools that they used to make that adaptation: fake
employers, fabricated paystubs, forged bank statements, and forged
125
college transcripts.
The court specifically quoted the testimony
of a senior mortgage lending expert who stated, “In this particular
case, almost every single document within the loan file was found
126
to be fraudulent or altered in some manner.”
The court also
described the junior mortgages that the defendants used to collect
their kickbacks as a scheme that required “a perversion of insider
127
knowledge.”
In examining the second Kenard factor (i.e., the severity level
assigned to a ranked offense with similar elements), the court
settled the outstanding factual dispute regarding the identity theft
of R.V. The court found that the State had proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that James and Wendy Ober were criminally
liable for the theft of R.V.’s identity in connection with the
128
purchase of the North Minneapolis home. In doing so, the court

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

§ 244.10, subdiv. 5a(a)(4)(ii), 5a(a)(4)(iv).
Order and Memorandum of Law, supra note 118.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 13–17.
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cited to various pieces of evidence and testimony, including the
129
The court also described the
text messages between the Obers.
defendants’ attempt to refute the State’s proof as “simply not
130
credible.”
Finally, in examining the third and fourth Kenard factors, the
trial court noted that it had ample precedent from other mortgagefraud racketeering cases prosecuted in Minnesota on which to
131
rely. In all of those cases, the trial courts ranked the defendants’
132
racketeering offense at severity level IX or X.
Although
acknowledging that precedent supported the argument, the court
133
declined the State’s request to rank the offense at a level X.
134
Instead, the court elected to rank the Obers’ offense at a level IX.
The court, however, added the following caveat in the conclusion
of its order:
This is not to excuse any of the conduct by either
Defendant in this case. The evidence has demonstrated
to this court that Defendants committed a menacing and
widespread scheme that knew few boundaries.
Defendants used a considerable array of tools at their
disposal to defraud lenders, rob distressed homeowners of
the equity in their homes, and steal the identity of an
135
innocent person.
Under the court’s level-IX ranking, the presumptive sentence
for both James and Wendy Ober (each of whom had zero criminal
136
history points) was between 74 and 103 months imprisonment.
That presumption, however, did not determine the ultimate
sentence. The court still had to complete its second and final task
of deciding whether the record established the existence of facts
supporting an upward (or, as the defendants requested, a
downward) departure. The court completed this final task on
September 13, 2012, when it held a sentencing hearing and issued
137
its sentencing order.
In its sentencing order, the court found that the State had
129. Id. at 14–16.
130. Id. at 17.
131. Id. at 18.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 22.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 4 (2010).
137. Sentencing Order, State v. Ober, Nos. 27-CR-11-18122, 27-CR-11-18119
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 13, 2012).
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proven beyond a reasonable doubt four separate bases for an
upward sentencing departure. First, the court found that both
James and Wendy Ober committed their crime as part of a group of
138
three or more people who actively participated in the crime.
Second, the court found that the defendants used the
139
identities of others without authorization to commit their crime.
This finding was not to be confused with the court’s earlier finding
that the Obers committed identity theft involving victim R.V.
Rather, this finding related to the use of counterfeit divorcees in
the defendants’ fraud scheme. As described above, the Obers used
those decrees to make it appear as though the borrower in whose
name a house was purchased (who, in reality, already owned
another home) was debt free by way of a (fictitious) divorce in
which the nonborrowing spouse received the home and its
associated debt. The court found that this aspect of the Obers’
crime used the identities of the real attorneys, judges, and court
staff, whose names and signatures were on the counterfeit decrees.
Third, the trial court found that the defendants’ crime was a
140
major economic offense.
This finding was based first on the
court’s conclusions that the underlying criminal acts involved a
monetary loss substantially greater than the minimum loss set forth
141
by statute. In other words, the court concluded that many of the
transactions in the case involved losses greater than the $35,000
statutory amount of the predicate offense of theft by swindle. The
court also concluded that the defendants used their positions and
status to facilitate the offense, citing the Obers’ abuse of trust of
both the lenders with whom they did business and the individual
142
borrowers who were conned into participating in the scheme.
Finally, the court found a fourth basis upon which to justify an
upward departure. As the court described it, the Obers’ crime
“targeted a vulnerable group of individuals who were losing their
143
homes and who were largely ignorant of the foreclosure process.”
This basis focused on another group of victims in the case—the
distressed homeowners who sold their homes without knowing that
138. Id. at 5–7; see MINN. STAT. § 244.10, subdiv. 5a(10) (2010).
139. Order and Memorandum of Law, supra note 118, at 7–8; see § 244.10,
subdiv. 5a(12).
140. Order and Memorandum of Law, supra note 118, at 10–15; see § 244.10,
subdiv. 5a(4).
141. Order and Memorandum of Law, supra note 118, at 10–12.
142. Id. at 12–15.
143. Id. at 15.
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the defendants’ scheme robbed them of substantial equity.
After then concluding that the defendants failed to show the
existence of any substantial grounds that excused or mitigated their
144
culpability, the trial court pronounced its sentence: 120 months
imprisonment, approximately $500,000 in restitution, and a
145
$50,000 fine.
VII. CONCLUSION
The evidence in the case against James and Wendy Ober might
best be summed up in the annals of alternative music: “good news
146
for people who love bad news.”
That is, the defendants’ crime
showed that the Great Recession did not eradicate mortgage and
real estate fraud and that complex financial crime is still alive and
well in Minnesota. But the prosecution of the case did have some
genuinely good news. It demonstrated that, although criminals will
continue to adapt to a changing world, Minnesota’s racketeering
statute is an equally nimble and effective foil to bring them to
justice.

144. Id. at 16–20.
145. Id. at 2–3.
146. MODEST MOUSE, GOOD NEWS
Music Entertainment, Inc. 2004).
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